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343 
(Un)Reasonable Expectation of Digital Privacy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The wide availability of the Internet has put the “world at our 
fingertips.” However, it has also put us at the world’s fingertips. A 
skilled user might be able to locate a great deal of information about 
a person through Facebook, MySpace, blogs, news articles, or any 
resumes that exist on the Internet. Companies, the government, and 
others can use tracking cookies and other widely available software to 
observe a user’s shopping habits and visited websites. These tools 
also permit third parties to obtain unique identifying information 
such as a user’s IP address, which is a unique number assigned to a 
computer or router when it accesses the Internet. Every click of the 
mouse, site visited, and page read creates a trail of digital cookie 
crumbs that can be analyzed and exploited by merchants, 
webmasters, and the government. In addition, all of this information 
presents a potential goldmine for law enforcement agencies to use in 
investigating crimes.  
Ever since Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their 
famous article The Right to Privacy in 1890,1 the right to privacy has 
been continually discussed, debated, and modified by the courts. 
The common law right to privacy in the United States has few 
contours and protections, particularly when compared to European 
countries.2 However, the constitutional right to privacy, embodied in 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable search and 
seizure, has developed into a genuine protection from government 
intrusion.3 The preliminary inquiry into whether a government 
search has occurred hinges on whether a person has a “reasonable 
                                                
 1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 2. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 484 
(2010) (“[T]he European Union has some of the strongest legal privacy protections in the 
world. By contrast, the United States has never been particularly focused on protecting 
individual privacy.”). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967); 
see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (“It is now well settled that ‘the Fourth 
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth’ Amendment.” (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
655 (1961))). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/26/2012 12:40 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
344 
expectation of privacy” in the object or place searched.4 To be found 
sufficiently reasonable, the expectation must be both subjectively and 
objectively reasonable.5  
While this test has arguably worked in the contexts in which it 
was originally developed,6 applying the reasonable expectation of 
privacy rationale in digital contexts has weakened privacy interests 
and will likely continue to do so. Simply put, since “the advent of 
the computer age, courts have struggled to balance privacy interests 
against law enforcement interests.”7 The result of this has been that 
“[a]s technology continues to advance . . . the area in which a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy [is] decreas[ing] until there is 
no place to go to seek a reasonable expectation of privacy.”8 Because 
of the relatively recent nature of the Internet and the subsequent 
wealth of information available for law enforcement purposes, the 
courts are far from conclusively defining the limits of law 
enforcement’s ability to conduct permissible digital “searches.”  
This Comment argues that the current reasonable expectation of 
privacy test is unable to adequately ensure that digital privacy 
interests are protected from warrantless intrusions. Instead, a better 
test is needed to reclaim some of the digital privacy interests that 
have already been undermined. This Comment contributes to the 
existing body of literature by synthesizing and expanding on existing 
critiques of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard as applied 
in the digital context,9 uniquely examining how the standard has 
played out in specific digital contexts, and proposing a broad 
combination of existing and new solutions to move digital privacy 
law in the right direction.  
                                                
 4. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 5. See id. at 361; In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“[T]he expectation of privacy has objective and subjective components.”). 
 6. For example, Katz involved the question of whether a listening device on the 
outside of a telephone booth violated the criminal defendant’s right to privacy. Katz, 389 U.S. 
at 348. 
 7. United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690, at *5 (D. Me. 
Dec. 3, 2009). 
 8. Jenny Parker Smith, Comment, Threatsense Technology: Sniffing Technology and the 
Threat to Your Fourth Amendment Rights, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 615, 628 (2011) (citing 
Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 MISS. L.J. 1, 
50 (2005)). 
 9. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for 
Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211 (2006) (focusing on 
the specific challenges of the third party doctrine and proposing a specific solution to that 
problem). 
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Part II explores the contours of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard and its general limitations, noting in particular the 
inherent conflict between the objective and subjective prongs of the 
current test. Part III examines four factors that have led the current 
reasonable expectation of privacy test to undermine digital privacy. 
These factors are (1) the increased gap between subjective and 
objective expectations in digital contexts, (2) contractual 
arrangements with Internet service providers, (3) storage of 
information on third-party servers, and (4) judges’ technological 
inexperience. Part IV demonstrates where the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test has fallen short by looking at digital privacy law as it 
relates to personal computers and “private” e-mail. Part V argues 
that legislatures and courts can assure that digital privacy rights are 
adequately protected from warrantless government intrusions by 
reforming the subjective prong of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard, eliminating the third party doctrine in digital 
contexts, and creating a broad concept of “shared privacy.”  
II. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY STANDARD 
The modern reasonable expectation of privacy standard for 
determining whether a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs can be 
traced back to Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States10 
where he broadly “defined a search as a violation of a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.”11 Justice Harlan articulated the “twofold 
requirement” of the test as “first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”12 The Court ultimately adopted Justice Harlan’s test 
less than a year later in Mancusi v. DeForte,13 and further clarified the 
test in Smith v. Maryland to make clear that the subjective prong 
means that “the individual has shown that ‘he seeks to preserve 
[something] as private.’”14 In subsequent cases, both of these prongs 
                                                
 10. 389 U.S. at 361. 
 11. Darren Kafka, Comment, Propping Up the Illusion of Computer Privacy in United 
States v. Burgess, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 747, 757 (2010). 
 12. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 13. 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (describing the test as “whether the [invaded] area was 
one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion”); 
Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 7 (2009). 
 14. 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (alteration in original) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351); 
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were further refined, but the resulting test is not without problems. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged criticisms of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, and yet it has consistently upheld and 
applied it to further define the contours of the right to privacy.15 
This Part outlines the contours of both the subjective and 
objective prongs of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, as well 
as the growth of the third party doctrine, which limits privacy 
protections for material shared with third parties. Each of these 
prongs has its own weaknesses, which should prompt caution when 
transplanting them into the modern digital context. 
A. Subjective Expectation of Privacy 
The subjective expectation of privacy is a very logical 
requirement in establishing a legitimate privacy interest. As a matter 
of policy, if a person does not have an actual expectation of privacy 
in a communication or a place, there is no reason why a right of 
privacy should be granted to that person. However, determining 
whether someone has a subjective expectation of privacy is a difficult 
inquiry. 
Supreme Court guidance on this prong since Katz has been very 
limited because this standard is necessarily fact-intensive. The limited 
guidance offered by the Court is that the individual must show, by 
some external manifestation, that “he seeks to preserve [something] 
as private.”16 This clarification is basic, but it seeks to transform the 
subjective prong into one that can be objectively measured. For an 
individual to have an expectation of privacy, there must be some 
outward evidence that the individual, “through his conduct . . . 
sought to protect something as private.”17 For searches involving a 
tangible object, this inquiry “traditionally focuses on whether the 
subject suitcase, footlocker, or other container is physically locked.”18 
With this clarification, in the majority of cases the subjective prong 
                                                                                                           
see also William C. Rava, Comment, Toward a Historical Understanding of Montana’s Privacy 
Provision, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1681, 1703 n.159 (1998). 
 15. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“The Katz test—whether the 
individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—has 
often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”). 
 16. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 17. Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 
MISS. L.J. 1035, 1057 (2011). 
 18. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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will not add much to the analysis and is essentially irrelevant.19 In 
practice, there will be very few cases where an individual does not 
have a subjective expectation of privacy and yet, if she had, society 
would have been willing to recognize it as reasonable. More often, 
the converse would be true; a person would have a subjective 
expectation of privacy, but society would recognize that expectation 
as unreasonable. 
Another major problem with this subjective prong is that its 
legitimacy relies upon accurately probing the mental state of an 
individual to see if she actually expects privacy. Absent a very unlikely 
admission by the individual that no privacy was expected, a judge is 
left to guess or infer a particular mental state from the person’s 
actions. The Supreme Court established this in Smith, but the result 
is unsatisfactory as the individual still has a difficult burden to 
“show[] that ‘he seeks to preserve [something] as private.’”20 While 
there are certain clear-cut cases that lie on the extremes of this test, 
there is also a vast field of fact patterns in the middle that have no 
clear resolution. In other words, there are many situations in which it 
is very difficult to tell from the external manifestations of an 
individual whether she has a subjective expectation of privacy. 
Because of the difficulty of administering this prong and the little 
practical value it adds to the privacy inquiry, in the majority of 
situations it will be swallowed up by, or merged with, the second 
prong of the test—whether the expectation of privacy is one which 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.21 
B. Society’s Objective Expectations 
Deciding what privacy expectations society is willing to accept as 
reasonable is also a difficult challenge. As with many reasonableness 
standards, courts are left to fill in the blanks with little guidance. In 
the forty years since Katz, courts have enunciated some vague 
guidelines to direct the objective expectation prong analysis, which 
unfortunately are not very useful outside of traditional privacy 
                                                
 19. See Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, 
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 28 (2002) (“[T]he first prong is, for 
all practical purposes, functionally irrelevant.”). 
 20. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. 
 21. See Cloud, supra note 19, at 28. It is also interesting to note that in cases 
subsequent to Katz, Justice Harlan, the proponent of the original test, only referenced the 
objective component. Winn, supra note 13, at 11. 
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contexts. In 1978, the Supreme Court declared that “[l]egitimation 
of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the 
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or 
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and 
permitted by society.”22 This statement focuses on traditional privacy 
contexts, as it emphasizes security in a place. Perhaps the better 
articulation of this “objective” standard is that judges should look at 
“widely shared social expectations.”23 However, while this narrows 
the inquiry to what society in general expects, it gives no guidance as 
to how to determine what that shared expectation is.24 And even 
with that standard, the Court noted that such social expectations are 
“naturally enough influenced by the law of property, but not 
controlled by its rules.”25 Tethering the reasonable expectation of 
privacy to the law of property may give useful guidance in some 
situations, particularly for conduct in the home, but it provides very 
little guidance for cyberspace where “place” becomes nebulous and 
real or personal property law may not give a clear answer to what 
society is willing to recognize as a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Because the Court has failed to nail down a clear objective 
standard to measure society’s expectations, particularly within the 
digital context, judging what society is willing to recognize as 
reasonable has become a very flexible standard. This flexibility might 
be seen as a virtue that allows certain societal interests in security, 
such as airline security, to trump an individual’s desire for privacy.26 
However, it is also concerning that an individual’s interest in privacy 
hinges “on whether ‘society’—i.e., some unspecified group of other 
individuals—approves of such protection.”27 This is even more 
concerning when it becomes one step removed and a judge is 
deciding what society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 
                                                
 22. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
 23. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 129 (2006). 
 24. This approach to applying the Fourth Amendment was heavily criticized by the 
dissent in Randolph. The dissent pointed out that society’s expectations change dramatically 
based on small changes in fact patterns and that “[s]uch shifting expectations are not a 
promising foundation on which to ground a constitutional rule.” Id. at 130 (Roberts, J., 
dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 111 (majority opinion). 
 26. Amy L. Peikoff, Pragmatism and Privacy, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 638, 639 
(2010). 
 27. Id. at 640. A potential solution to this problem is discussed infra Part V.A. 
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Another general problem with this prong is that it develops the 
law using a case-by-case approach.28 Although this can be a virtue in 
some situations, in privacy law the result has been a vague standard 
accompanied by inconsistent applications, which hinders the 
underlying privacy interest.29 The protections of privacy have been 
further limited because, after being created by the Warren Court 
(which viewed the Fourth Amendment more expansively), the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test was subsequently interpreted 
and defined by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, which tended “to 
be less protective in the criminal procedure arena generally.”30 And 
because this test is particularly vague, it is even more subject to 
judicial whim than it would otherwise be. Finally, and most 
troubling, because judges have some insulation from the “real 
world,” it should come as no surprise that judges may falsely declare 
that society is not willing to recognize an expectation of privacy as 
reasonable, when the exact opposite may be true.31 This is confirmed 
by the latest empirical research on expectations of privacy, which 
suggests “that lay perceptions in fact differ from Supreme Court 
doctrine—at times substantially.”32 
C. Third Party Doctrine 
Related to the reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court in 
Katz also elaborated the third party doctrine,33 which states that 
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”34 
                                                
 28. Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment, Privacy and Advancing Technology, 80 
MISS. L.J. 1131, 1154–55 (2011); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 
(2010) (“[T]he question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 29. See Weaver, supra note 28, at 1154–55. 
 30. Id. at 1156. 
 31. One commentator has pointed out that ultimately the objective prong of this test 
“turn[s] on the subjective views of a majority of the Justices about what privacy expectations 
are objectively ‘reasonable.’” Cloud, supra note 19, at 28. 
 32. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera Adya & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of 
Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 341 (2009). 
 33. This doctrine has also been termed the “voluntary disclosure doctrine,” “knowing 
exposure,” or the “assumption of risk principle.” Brenner, supra note 8, at 39; Christian M. 
Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom and the Property of 
Personhood as Fourth Amendment Norm, 42 AKRON L. REV. 803, 842 (2009); Junichi P. 
Semitsu, From Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social Networking Privacy Rights 
Revolutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291, 298 (2011). 
 34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Semitsu, supra note 33, at 
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At its basic level, this doctrine “recognizes that the government does 
not unlawfully invade a person’s privacy when it uses information a 
defendant disclosed in conversation with a government informant, 
undercover agent, or other witness, regardless of whether that 
conversation took place in a ‘private’ context.”35 The Supreme Court 
has further clarified that a person does not maintain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in records that are held in third-party 
storage.36 
In at least some instances, the third party doctrine serves as a 
substantial limitation on an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy. In many cases, it can completely undermine what would 
appear to be a private situation, as in a discussion with a close friend. 
The Supreme Court has said that “when an individual reveals private 
information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will 
reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that 
information.”37  
The third party doctrine makes the most sense in the contexts it 
originally derived from. In United States v. Miller, the government 
was able to obtain a customer’s bank records from the bank that 
retained them,38 and in Smith v. Maryland, the government was able 
to obtain from a phone company the numbers dialed from the 
defendant’s phone.39 In both of these cases, the defendant 
voluntarily and knowingly shared specific, limited information with 
the service provider to enable them to provide the service. The 
holdings of these cases “center on the fact that the information at 
issue was divulged as part of the regularly transacted business 
between the user and the third party, and was kept as a record of 
such transaction.”40 Even without the third party doctrine, it would 
be difficult to argue that the defendant had a subjective expectation 
                                                                                                           
298 (explaining the effect of the “Third Party Doctrine”). 
 35. Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Criminal Discovery of Internet 
Communications Under the Stored Communications Act: It’s Not a Level Playing Field, 97 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 569, 574 (2007). 
 36. Id. at 575; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 37. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984); see also Brenner, supra note 
8, at 39 (elaborating on the rationale stated in Jacobsen). 
 38. Miller, 425 U.S. at 436. 
 39. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
 40. Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 35, at 575. 
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of privacy in that information, or that society would be willing to 
recognize that expectation as reasonable. However, as detailed 
below, this doctrine breaks down in digital contexts.41 
III. DIGITAL COMPLICATIONS 
Arguably, the reasonable expectation of privacy standard works 
in traditional Fourth Amendment settings such as searches of 
vehicles, homes, and instances involving customer information, 
where it has already been defined and applied. However, the digital 
age has amplified the standard’s quirks and limitations in ways that 
Justice Harlan could not have fathomed when he announced the 
standard over forty years ago. As Justice Scalia put it: “It would be 
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by 
the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance 
of technology.”42 This advancement of technology has created 
problems that challenge consistent application of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard and threaten digital privacy.43 
Four central problems have arisen with the advent of digital 
technology. These are (1) the increased gap between what level of 
privacy individuals expect in digital information and what society (i.e. 
a court) is willing to recognize as reasonable, (2) terms of service 
agreements that undermine significant privacy interests, (3) the 
enormous expansion of situations that implicate the third party 
doctrine, and (4) a judiciary that lacks the technical expertise to 
effectively define digital privacy. 
A. The Digital “Expectations” Chasm 
With the rise of the latest digital technologies, there is an 
increasing gap between what a court is willing to recognize as private 
and what an individual subjectively expects as private, as detailed 
above. The basic problem is that the inner workings of the Internet 
and other digital technologies produce a much larger data trail than 
most people expect, and portions of that data trail are available to 
more people and companies than most would expect.44 And because 
                                                
 41. See infra Part III.C. 
 42. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001). 
 43. Some proposals to address these problems are offered. See infra Part V. 
 44. See, e.g., Athima Chansanchai, Many Sharing More on Facebook Than They Know, 
DIGITAL LIFE ON TODAY (Apr. 11, 2011, 12:06 PM), http://tinyurl.com/3l35tz3 
(summarizing a study from Columbia University, which found that almost 94% of respondents 
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judges base society’s expectations on the nature of the underlying 
technology,45 the gap persists and increases as technology progresses. 
Simply put, judges use a stricter standard to measure privacy 
expectations than individuals do, which leads to faulty conclusions 
that society does not expect privacy in most digital contexts. 
Web 2.046 has brought new challenges for the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard. The increase of “voices online” and 
the quantity of “recording devices” has incidentally resulted in more 
information being gathered from users.47 But incidentally sharing 
more information with various sources should not necessarily 
decrease the amount of privacy that users of these technologies 
deserve and expect. Certainly, those who post material on a public 
blog recognize that they are giving up privacy for that information, 
but should the same hold true for cell phone users whose 
movements are incidentally tracked as the phone locates the closest 
tower to facilitate service?48 This wealth of digital information is 
breaking down the boundaries between public and private 
information, and as one commentator concluded, “any privacy laws 
premised on now-dated conceptions of a ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ are becoming more difficult to apply.”49 What this means for 
                                                                                                           
had revealed information on Facebook that they did not intend to). 
 45. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34. 
 46. Web 2.0 “refers . . . to the ‘participatory nature of how a website’s content is 
created and delivered’” and encompasses modern social networks and wikis where most of the 
content is user-generated. Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 420 n.8 (Md. 2011) (citing Seth P. 
Berman, Lam D. Nguyen & Julie S. Chrzan, Web 2.0: What’s Evidence Between ‘‘Friends’’?, 
BOS. B. J., 5, 5 (Jan.–Feb. 2009)). 
 47. Lipton, supra note 2, at 481–82. The Internet has greatly increased the total 
quantity of recorded conversations as information is continually stored on various websites 
(particularly social network sites) and in a user’s cache/cookies. 
 48. See James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protections to 
Keep Pace with Technology, 935 PRAC. L. INST./PAT 543, 548 (2008) (“Among other things, 
cell phones can serve as location tracking devices. Automobiles also increasingly have geo-
location features.”). Recently, a German politician obtained his records from his cellphone 
company showing that “[i]n a six-month period, . . . [his service provider] had recorded and 
saved his longitude and latitude coordinates more than 35,000 times.” Noam Cohen, It’s 
Tracking Your Every Move and You May Not Even Know, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/business/media/26privacy.html?_r=2. 
The potential problems with tracking have become even more serious as it has been revealed 
that Apple’s iPhone intentionally tracks user movements and stores the data on the device 
itself. See Charles Arthur, iPhone Keeps Record of Everywhere You Go, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Apr. 
20, 2011, 2:06 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/apr/20/iphone-
tracking-prompts-privacy-fears. 
 49. Lipton, supra note 2, at 482. 
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users of technology is that while their subjective expectation of 
privacy in digitally shared information may remain strong, the fact 
that the information is generated and shared regularly suggests that 
courts are less willing to recognize such an expectation as reasonable 
and, consequently, that law enforcement can freely gather and use 
such information without obtaining a warrant. 
B. Undermining Digital Privacy by Agreement 
Because the objective prong of the Katz test is heavily fact-based, 
it can be dramatically changed by contract.50 Few would argue that 
one should not be able to sign a contract that gives up a privacy 
right. In fact, this is a common occurrence in employment 
contracts,51 cell-phone contracts,52 and contracts for credit cards.53 In 
each of these cases, the individual signing the contract grants the 
right to the other party to have access to that person’s data, whether 
it be to search the person’s work e-mail, record information about 
the person’s phone usage, or track the person’s spending. The 
premise behind these types of contracts does not generally offend a 
person’s sense of fairness, because the privacy is knowingly and 
expressly given up, and often for the purpose of enabling the other 
party to better provide a desired service. However, the lines of 
fairness can be blurred, and in some cases dissolved, when similar 
contracts are “entered into” online. 
Virtually every website and online service provider has a set of 
terms associated with the site or service. These terms are often called 
“End User License Agreements,” “Terms and Conditions,” “Terms 
of Service,” or simply “Terms,” and purport to bind the user to an 
agreement. These terms can come in the form of a clickwrap 
                                                
 50. Cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (“[E]mployer policies   
. . . shape the reasonable expectations of their employees . . . .”). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (company 
policy allowed monitoring of “all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages”). 
 52. See, e.g., VERIZON CUSTOMER AGREEMENT, http://www.verizonwireless.com 
(click “Customer Agreement” at bottom of site) (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) (“We collect 
personal information about you. We gather some information through our relationship with 
you, such as information about the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination and 
amount of your use of our telecommunications services.”). 
 53. See, e.g., TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF BANKAMERICARD VISA, 
http://tinyurl.com/7sc7wnb (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) (“You consent to our sharing of 
information about you and your account with the organization, if any, endorsing this credit 
card program. You authorize us to share with others, to the extent permitted by law, such 
information and our credit experience with you.”). 
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agreement (clicking “I Accept” or its equivalent), a browsewrap 
agreement (where a notice at the bottom of the page binds the user 
to the terms and acceptance is presumed by continuing to use the 
site), and potentially even cookiewrap agreements (where acceptance 
of an agreement is stored in a cookie and used on subsequent visits 
to a site).54 These online agreements are becoming so commonplace 
that it would be nearly impossible for an individual to read all of the 
agreements that he “accepts,” and studies suggest that extremely few 
people ever read any.55  
Despite being ignored by users, these forms of online contracts 
are gaining judicial approval, thereby undermining the traditional 
doctrine of assent.56 What this means for the traditional reasonable 
expectation of digital privacy analysis is that an expectation that 
contradicts the terms of an online agreement is likely not one that a 
court is willing to recognize is accepted by society as reasonable, 
even if individuals do not realize that they are contracting away 
privacy rights. For example, Google’s “Terms of Service” provide 
that “Google reserves the right (but shall have no obligation) to pre-
screen, review, flag, filter, modify, refuse or remove any or all 
Content from any Service.”57 After “agreeing” to Google’s terms of 
service, it is hard to argue that you have any expectation of privacy 
from Google, who can then freely share information with law 
enforcement. Facebook’s terms are even more direct. Facebook’s 
privacy policy provides that it “may share your information in 
response to a legal request (like a search warrant, court order or 
subpoena) if we have a good faith belief that the law requires us to 
do so.”58  
As terms in these agreements become more onerous and move 
towards uniformly removing a person’s privacy, society’s 
expectations will naturally change. A user agreement by one online 
service provider may be an anomaly that does not affect what society 
will recognize as reasonable, but an industry standard likely will. 
                                                
 54. See Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 799 (2007); Max 
Stul Oppenheimer, Consent Revisited, 12 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2010). 
 55. Kim, supra note 54, at 800. 
 56. Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine Inquiries, 52 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 47 (2012).  
 57. GOOGLE TERMS OF SERVICE 8.3, http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
 58. FACEBOOK DATA USE POLICY, http://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
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After all, who can say that they reasonably expect privacy in an area 
where online service providers universally disclaim that such a privacy 
interest exists and most users appear to agree to such terms? 
C. Exponential Third-Party Growth 
The third party doctrine, elaborated above, has the potential to 
destroy almost all digital privacy. When applied to the Internet 
context, the principle has very few limits. For example, under a literal 
application of the doctrine, any user posting material on a social 
networking site would lose any reasonable expectation of privacy, 
regardless of the user’s privacy settings,59 simply because the user 
knowingly exposes the content to Facebook staff, a third party to the 
communication.60 In fact, virtually all online activity would fail to 
meet the reasonable expectation of privacy standard because most 
websites and online services create a record of “regularly transacted 
business,” such as visits to the site, content shared, purchases, and 
other associated data.61 As one commentator put it, “[we] have no 
expectation of privacy in information . . . shared with [online] 
entities or information they have gathered about [us].”62 Law 
enforcement can thus direct the activities of these online service 
providers and obtain requisite information “without a warrant based 
on suspicion or simple curiosity.”63 
The Supreme Court has not yet decided how the third party 
doctrine applies in the context of the Internet,64 but other courts 
have generally upheld the application of the doctrine. For example, 
in United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit held that “e-mail and 
Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from 
addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they 
visit because they should know that this information is provided to 
                                                
 59. Facebook allows a user to control who can see posted content by adjusting 
individual privacy settings that range from sharing with “Friends Only” to sharing with the 
public generally. FACEBOOK, http://tinyurl.com/83b9gds (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
 60. Semitsu, supra note 33, at 296. 
 61. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 35, at 575. 
 62. Brenner, supra note 8, at 56–57. 
 63. Id. at 57, 61–62. 
 64. Nathan Petrashek, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of 
Online Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1520 (2010) (citing Robert Ditzion, Note, 
Electronic Surveillance in the Internet Age: The Strange Case of Pen Registers, 41 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1321, 1334 (2004)). 
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and used by Internet service providers.”65 It is unclear whether 
courts will extend the third party doctrine to content stored on 
third-party servers beyond Internet identifiers shared with Internet 
service providers.66 However, a literal application of the third party 
doctrine suggests that courts will likely extend the doctrine to such 
kinds of content. 
D. Judicial Technological Inexperience 
It is no secret that younger generations are the masters of the 
latest technology, and that many older judges struggle to understand 
the highly technical aspects of this technology.67 With such a 
disadvantage, it is not impossible to reach correct results, but it is 
certainly more difficult.68 How is a judge who has never used 
Facebook supposed to understand to what extent society is willing to 
recognize each type of communication made on the site as private? 
Or how can a judge with no technological background grasp the 
intricacies of an IP address that allows substantial tracking of 
individuals online, and at the same time gauge how much privacy 
society feels it is giving up by going online? Drawing distinct lines 
with such limited information will lead to inconsistency and a 
confusing standard.69 
                                                
 65. 512 F.3d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 
1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Every federal court to address this issue has held that 
subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment's privacy expectation.”); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We 
conclude that plaintiffs in these cases lack a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in their 
subscriber information because they communicated it to the systems operators.”). But see State 
v. Reid, 914 A.2d 310, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (“[D]efendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her ISP account information.”). 
 66. See Semitsu, supra note 33, at 338–42. This concept is explored further in the e-mail 
context in Part IV.B. 
 67. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 958 (2005) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to “the limitations facing judges where matters of 
technology are concerned”). 
 68. See Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(“‘[T]he task of generating balanced and nuanced rules’ in this area ‘requires a comprehensive 
understanding of technological facts.’” (quoting Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and 
New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 875 
(2004))). 
 69. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (“The judiciary risks 
error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology 
before its role in society has become clear.”). 
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As a result, courts appear increasingly willing to sacrifice digital 
privacy to crack down on cybercrimes,70 but they walk a dangerous 
road. In most cases, courts do not possess “an informed 
understanding of the technical facts they need to appreciate the 
technology they are attempting to regulate.”71 Because of this, 
judges must often “rely on the crutch of questionable metaphors to 
aid their comprehension.”72 But how much is a wireless network 
really like a cordless phone?73 Or a computer like a suitcase or 
briefcase?74 These metaphors may allow judges to reach some correct 
conclusions, but they have the potential to quickly break down and 
cause the law to do the same, allowing for more illegitimate 
government intrusions into an individual’s privacy than would 
otherwise be warranted.75 Where judges are more comfortable with 
the facts, they will naturally reason through the issues better and 
reach more sound conclusions. Where the reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard is extremely fact-intensive, judges’ technological 
inexperience and misunderstandings threaten to further undermine 
digital privacy interests. 
IV. SPECIFIC DIGITAL PRIVACY SHORTCOMINGS 
Articles on Fourth Amendment digital privacy tend to focus on 
either privacy from government surveillance technology76 or privacy 
                                                
 70. See, e.g., id. (allowing a government employer to obtain transcripts of employee’s 
text messages on a company pager); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 1678 (2011). 
 71. Kerr, supra note 68, at 879. 
 72. Id. at 875–76. 
 73. See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 
28, 2010).  
 74. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 75. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A]nalogies to 
closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to ‘oversimplify a complex area of Fourth 
Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern computer storage.’” 
(quoting Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 75, 104 (1994))); see also United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066–67 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that a police officer had to be present where a search was conducted of an 
e-mail provider’s server without realizing that police would not be any help and would not 
know how to prevent Fourth Amendment violations in that context); Kerr, supra note 68, at 
878–79 (explaining that the problems caused in Bach were the result of a lack of technical 
knowledge and arguing that the majority of technically complex cases happen under similar 
circumstances). 
 76. E.g., Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297 (2003); 
Lindsey Gil, Note, Bad Intent or Just a Bad Day? Fourth Amendment Implications Raised by 
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on social networks.77 However, the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard applies well beyond these two areas to other categories that 
deserve individualized analysis. Looking at the current case law 
discussing privacy in personal computers and personal e-mail 
demonstrates what Professor Kerr has previously observed: “the 
answer to the question of how much privacy protection the Fourth 
Amendment guarantees to Internet communications appears to be 
‘not much.’ And certainly not enough.”78 The following examples 
demonstrate where the traditional reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard has failed in digital contexts and where the courts have yet 
to clearly define boundaries. 
A. Personal Computing 
The important inquiry for determining Fourth Amendment 
limits in the personal computing context is what an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy is for circumstances involving data 
stored on a personal computer. Courts have held that “as a general 
matter an individual has an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his personal computer.”79 However, this reasonable 
expectation “can be diminished by one’s conduct with the 
computer.”80 For example, courts have held that file-sharing destroys 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in data stored on a personal 
computer.81 The destruction of that privacy interest might be so 
thorough that “a court would uphold a federal agent’s suspicionless 
and warrantless search of any computer folder that is accessible by a 
file-sharing program.”82 The relevant question then is how far the 
                                                                                                           
Technological Advances in Security Screening, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 231 (2010); Stephen 
Hoffman, Comment, Biometrics, Retinal Scanning, and the Right to Privacy in the 21st 
Century, 22 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 38 (2010); Smith, supra note 8, at 615. 
 77. E.g., Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)space of One’s Own: On Privacy and Online 
Social Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73 (2008); Brian Kane, Balancing 
Anonymity, Popularity, & Micro-Celebrity: The Crossroads of Social Networking & Privacy, 20 
ALB. L.J. SCI & TECH. 327 (2010); Semitsu, supra note 33; Petrashek, supra note 64, at 1520. 
 78. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy 
Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 814 (2003). 
 79. United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 80. United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *12–15 (D. Or. Jan. 
28, 2010); see also Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1127 (holding that defendant’s expectation of privacy 
did not survive his “decision to install and use file-sharing software, thereby opening his 
computer to anyone else with the same freely available program”). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 82. Kafka, supra note 11, at 757. This could potentially include the full contents of the 
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privacy interest in information stored on a computer extends where 
there is less than a file-sharing arrangement. 
For example, an individual has an absolute privacy interest in a 
computer that is in her home,83 password protected,84 and not 
connected to any networks.85 Beyond that, courts have recognized 
that “the mere act of accessing a network does not in itself 
extinguish privacy expectations.”86 However, once a computer 
accesses the Internet, its owner can expect to lose a great degree of 
privacy in his computer. For example, merely transmitting your 
information to an Internet service provider (“ISP”) such as Comcast, 
Time Warner, or even a cellphone company, opens your information, 
including your IP address, to government access.87 Furthermore, 
courts have deemed “Internet identifiers” to be beyond an 
individual’s privacy interests because they are disclosed to third-party 
websites.88 The troubling aspect of this line of reasoning is that many 
users never even know that they are disclosing these identifiers. 
Certainly, most users have not undertaken any intentional action to 
disclose these identifiers other than merely accessing these websites, 
which can hardly be deemed consent to sacrificing one’s privacy.  
Beyond individuals’ passive disclosure of information on the 
Internet, law enforcement officers have been given great latitude to 
affirmatively gather information on individuals through online tools 
                                                                                                           
computer’s hard drive. 
 83. See United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Individuals 
generally possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers.”); Guest v. Leis, 
255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Home owners would of course have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their homes and in their belongings—including computers—inside 
the home.”). 
 84. Some courts have recognized that password protection and encryption entitle the 
user to a greater level of privacy protection. Kafka, supra note 11, at 758; see also United States 
v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (analogizing password protection to a lock on 
a footlocker or suitcase); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
consent to search a computer did not extend to co-tenant’s password protected files). 
 85. Interestingly enough, this situation protects deleted files, although under traditional 
privacy law, there is no privacy interest in abandoned material. Kafka, supra note 11, at 757–
58; see also United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 n.3 (1st Cir. 1999) (“We reject the 
government's suggestion that, by deleting the images, Upham ‘abandoned’ them and 
surrendered his right of privacy.”). 
 86. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 87. United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (collecting 
cases where transmitting information to a service provider opened that information to the 
government). 
 88. White v. Baker, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1303 n.9 (N.D. Ga. 2010). 
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without obtaining a search warrant.89 This has proven extremely 
useful where the law allows as little information as an IP address to 
sufficiently pinpoint the location of a user through subpoenaing an 
ISP.90 These strategies have proven especially effective in tracking 
down and prosecuting child pornographers and other online 
offenders.91 However, this extra measure of safety has come at the 
price of digital privacy. The closest nondigital analogy to this 
government action is the gathering of phone records from relevant 
service providers because both involve giving ongoing information to 
an outside company to use its service. However, the quantity of 
information that can be gathered digitally is much greater than what 
was traditionally available to law enforcement through phone 
records. If these differences were noted and treated as such, perhaps 
the courts could have crafted the law to provide greater privacy 
protection for activities that take place on private computers, even 
when users access the Internet.  
B. “Private” E-mail 
One of the most troubling areas where the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis falls short is the protection of personal 
e-mail. Courts have been clear that a company may intercept and 
read its employees’ e-mails, particularly when authorized by a 
company policy.92 This makes sense because the e-mail system is 
                                                
 89. See United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (using peer-to-
peer software); United States v. Courtney, No. 4:07CR261 JLH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
109344, at *5–6 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 22, 2008) (employing chat rooms, Internet searches, and 
social networking sites); United States v. Carter, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (D. Nev. 2008) 
(posting links to a dummy website on a child pornography website to record the IP addresses 
of users). 
 90. See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Haffner, No. CR-337-J-34-TEM, 2010 WL 5296920, at 
*2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2010); United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at 
*2 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010); United States v. Christie, 570 F. Supp. 2d 657, 690 (D.N.J. 
2008). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in Internet use where company policy allows monitoring of “all file 
transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages”); Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, 2004 WL 
2066746, at *21 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2004) (no reasonable expectation of privacy where 
company policy bans personal use of office computers and allows monitoring); Kelleher v. City 
of Reading, 2002 WL 1067442, at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2002) (no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in e-mail because of city policy); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996) (no expectation of privacy in company e-mail notwithstanding assurances by 
management that e-mail would not be intercepted); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. 
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provided by the company and the employees have generally 
consented to that as a condition of employment. But where would 
the government get a similar right to intercept and read e-mails 
without that conduct constituting a search? To best understand how 
e-mail should be treated under traditional privacy law, it is useful to 
look at its “real-world” counterpart. 
The established privacy rule for standard mail is that it is entitled 
to Fourth Amendment protection while in the custody of the U.S. 
Postal Service.93 The Fourth Amendment specifically mentions 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects,”94 and the Supreme Court has declared that a 
letter is a “paper or effect” that deserves protection.95 What this 
means is that, absent a warrant, the government only has access to 
the outward form of the mail and its weight, but not its contents.96   
However, this protection only applies where the mail is “sealed” and 
thus would not protect, for example, an unpackaged magazine or 
newspaper.97 
E-mail is roughly analogous to regular first-class mail as even its 
name (“electronic mail”) suggests. The primary differences are that 
1) e-mail is sent through third-party Internet service providers rather 
than through a government entity, similar to mail sent through 
third-party carriers like UPS and FedEx, and 2) the message is coded 
into digital information for transmission and permanent storage. 
These differences are so small that it is difficult to argue that e-mail 
should have any less protection than regular mail. One commentator 
even makes the case that perhaps e-mail deserves greater Fourth 
Amendment protection than regular mail.98 As mentioned above, the 
                                                                                                           
Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (“[E]mployer policies concerning communications will of course shape 
the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are 
clearly communicated.”). 
 93. Ryan A. Ray, The Warrantless Interception of E-mail: Fourth Amendment Search or 
Free Rein for the Police?, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 178, 200 (2010). 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 95. Ray, supra note 93, at 200; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 460 
(1928). 
 96. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). 
 97. Ray, supra note 93, at 202; see also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 
251 (1970) (distinguishing “first-class mail such as letters and sealed packages” from 
“newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter”). 
 98. Ray, supra note 93, at 205–06. The author argues that the reasonable expectation of 
privacy in e-mail has been increased by the Wiretap Act, which prohibits “the interception of e-
mail by law enforcement and Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) employees,” and by policies 
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to/from addresses of e-mails are not protected, just as the identity of 
the recipient of regular mail is not protected.99 However, it remains 
unclear from the case law whether individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the content of their private e-mail messages 
stored on third-party servers. 
The earliest case suggesting that an individual might have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail content was Warshak v. 
United States in 2007.100 In Warshak, a panel on the Sixth Circuit 
upheld a preliminary injunction against government monitoring of 
Warshak’s e-mail through his e-mail service provider.101 The court 
analogized the content of e-mail to the content of telephone calls102 
and held that “individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in e-mails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a 
commercial ISP. The content of e-mail is something that the user 
‘seeks to preserve as private,’ and therefore ‘may be constitutionally 
protected.’”103 The court had no problem upholding the privacy 
interest, although the e-mail provider routinely scanned the contents 
of messages for pornography and viruses.104 The court also noted 
that if the user agreement had “call[ed] for regular auditing, 
inspection, or monitoring of e-mails,” the expectation of privacy 
could have been different.105 Ultimately, however, the Sixth Circuit’s 
panel opinion was later vacated when the court, en banc, determined 
that “Warshak’s constitutional claim [was] not ripe for judicial 
resolution.”106 The Sixth Circuit did, however, reaffirm that an 
individual’s expectation of privacy in e-mail content “shifts from 
internet-service agreement to internet-service agreement.”107 This is 
particularly troublesome today where major e-mail providers 
undermine privacy through their usually unread terms of service.108 
The latest major case on privacy in e-mail content, Rehberg v. 
Paulk, suggests the opposite result from Warshak but is no more 
                                                                                                           
created by ISPs that treat customer e-mail as confidential. Id. at 205. 
 99. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 100. 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 101. Id. at 482.  
 102. Id. at 469–70. 
 103. Id. at 473 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
 104. Id. at 474. 
 105. Id. at 473. 
 106. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 107. Id. at 526–27. 
 108. See, e.g., GOOGLE TERMS OF SERVICE, supra note 57, at 8.3. 
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conclusive.109 In Rehberg, the Eleventh Circuit was presented with 
the issue of whether a chief investigator violated the Fourth 
Amendment when he subpoenaed an Internet service provider to 
obtain Rehberg’s personal e-mails.110 When reviewing cases from 
other circuits, the court found that “[s]ome circuit decisions suggest 
in dicta that a person loses a legitimate expectation of privacy in e-
mails sent to and received by a third-party recipient.”111 However, 
instead of deciding the case on Fourth Amendment grounds, the 
court “resolve[d] this case narrowly” by holding that “at a minimum 
Rehberg ha[d] not shown his alleged constitutional right was clearly 
established.”112 The ultimate result of this holding was that 
Rehberg’s constitutional claim was denied, suggesting that the court 
would have decided against the right to privacy in Rehberg’s e-mail 
content if it had decided the issue. The Supreme Court recently 
granted certiorari to hear the case and will hopefully provide more 
guidance on this issue.113 
Ultimately, determining whether a privacy interest exists in e-
mail may depend on security measures that the individual seeks to 
employ, such as encrypting messages,114 and on the degree of privacy 
provided by the terms of service agreement between the customer 
and the e-mail service provider. However, focusing on these two 
factors could leave e-mail content open to warrantless government 
searches in the majority of instances because personal encryption is 
not regularly used and terms of service tend to undermine digital 
privacy. As a result, privacy expectations that both society and 
individuals are likely willing to accept as reasonable are instead 
subject to unbridled government intrusion. Ultimately, this weakens 
the protection of Fourth Amendment rights that are guaranteed by 
the Constitution and ought to be preserved. 
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard is flawed, as 
detailed above, and provides inadequate protection for individual 
                                                
 109. 611 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1678 (2011). 
 110. Id. at 843. 
 111. Id. The Eleventh Circuit seemed to be focusing on the assumption of risk that the 
recipient would disclose the content, and then analogized that to third party ISPs. 
 112. Id. at 846. 
 113. Rehberg, 131 S. Ct. at 1678. 
 114. This could be analogous to “sealing” first class mail. 
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privacy. The digital age has further exposed the limitations of this 
standard as judges have applied the fact-intensive standard to 
decrease individuals’ privacy based on the nature of new 
technologies, rather than on society’s actual expectations.115 To 
prevent further weakening of privacy interests, it is important that 
legislatures and courts act to change the current reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard so that it more coherently fits into 
the digital context. This Part details potential solutions to this critical 
problem. 
A. Giving Society’s Expectations Back to Society 
One simple change that could address some of the problems in 
modern digital privacy law is to reform how the Katz test itself is 
applied. Practical application of the objective prong by courts denies 
to individuals Fourth Amendment protection even if a vast majority 
of people in society expect privacy in an identical situation. Instead 
of focusing on what a judge recognizes as society’s expectation of 
privacy,116 which is mostly decided on the basis of the nature of the 
technology instead of shared expectations, society’s broad interests in 
privacy would be better served if the test accounted for what society 
actually expects in matters of privacy. To do this, courts should take 
an empirical approach, rather than a purely subjective one, when 
determining societal expectations on privacy issues. This would help 
overcome the problem that currently exists where judicial views on 
privacy matters “trickle[] down to the general population where it 
eventually becomes reasonable, regardless of whether it actually was 
reasonable to begin with.”117  
One commentator attempted to measure public expectations of 
privacy when he gathered data on how intrusive the public felt 
various forms of public surveillance were.118 A small group of people 
                                                
 115. See supra Part II.B. 
 116. The Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge that society’s expectations are defined 
by judges when Justice Kennedy wrote that “[i]n Katz, the Court relied on its own knowledge 
and experience to conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone 
booth.” City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 117. R. Bruce Wells, Comment, The Fog of Cloud Computing: Fourth Amendment Issues 
Raised by the Blurring of Online and Offline Content, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 237–38 
(2009) (citing Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 106–07 (2008)). 
 118. Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951, 954 
(2009) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER SLOGOBIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007)). 
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summoned for jury duty in Florida was asked to rank various forms 
of surveillance on a scale of 1-100, after which the results were 
compiled and compared.119 The results showed a range of the 
public’s expectation in privacy from the minimal intrusiveness of 
“[l]ooking in foliage in the park” to the maximum intrusiveness of 
“[s]earching a bedroom.”120 Although the study was not conducted 
widely and focused only on certain forms of surveillance, it shows the 
feasibility of statistically measuring what privacy interests the public is 
willing to recognize as reasonable. A similar approach could be used 
in criminal cases to determine what society actually believes is 
reasonable, particularly with regards to digital privacy issues where a 
judge may not be in a position to fully understand the technology 
and gauge the mindsets of those who use it.121 
Admittedly, taking an empirical approach in every case presents a 
potential problem of cost for the parties litigating the issue. 
However, using empirical evidence does not suggest that the parties 
will need to conduct unique statistical studies in each situation, 
which may not be reliable anyway as the parties bring their biases 
into the analysis. Rather, if courts were to show their willingness to 
engage in empirical inquiries, it is probable that independent studies 
would be conducted on the nature of privacy interests. Such research 
could form the basis for expert testimony that would serve the same 
purpose as conducting unique studies for each case, would be more 
neutral, and would more accurately reflect public notions of privacy. 
This proposed modification in applying the test would improve 
the Katz formula by changing the second prong to more accurately 
reflect society’s expectations. Admittedly, it is not completely 
immune from some of the same problems as the current test, but it 
fares significantly better. Determination of society’s views would still 
be somewhat subject to judges’ individual views on privacy. 
Although a judge would hear evidence on what society expects and is 
willing to recognize as reasonable, ultimately, the nuances and gaps 
in the rule will be filled in case-by-case with what individual judges 
think is reasonable. However, requiring judges to consider empirical 
                                                
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. It is interesting to note that on the “Transactional Surveillance” survey, 
investigating “Web sites visited” ranked high on the list for intrusiveness (18/25), just behind 
“Search of car” and “E-mail addresses sent to and received from,” the latter of which ranked 
even higher (21/25). Id. at 956. 
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evidence or expert testimony concerning society’s actual expectations 
would narrow judicial discretion and help judges more accurately 
gauge society’s views. 
B. Limiting the Third Party Doctrine 
The third party doctrine was established prior to the digital age, 
and its advocates could not have fully contemplated society’s heavy 
reliance on digitally stored information.122 With so much personal 
information at risk, perhaps it is time to put an end to the third party 
doctrine, or at least limit its application to the more traditional 
privacy contexts it was designed for. With the wealth of digital 
information in the hands of third parties, digital privacy is almost 
completely undermined by the third party doctrine. That doctrine 
has become “increasingly archaic and problematic” as the third party 
is increasingly “a seemingly anonymous and automated online media 
service provider.”123 Eliminating this doctrine would prevent the loss 
of any and all privacy protection in the digital context, and allow the 
reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry to be more fully carried 
out.  
One scholar has optimistically pointed out that trends in the past 
decade suggest that the third party doctrine is already in decline and 
will continue until extinction.124 Hopefully, this trend will continue 
for the sake of digital privacy. The third party doctrine has already 
significantly undermined digital privacy by allowing the government 
to collect service providers’ records without a warrant, and if the 
doctrine is not limited, the problem will only become worse as 
technology advances.125 By putting the vast majority of our digital 
privacy in the hands of service providers, we are unintentionally 
giving up privacy in many areas of our lives that should remain 
private. Requiring such a sacrifice of privacy just to access the 
benefits of modern technology is nonsensical, and the third party 
doctrine should be limited to avoid this result. 
                                                
 122. See Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of 
Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 174 
(2011). Cloud computing involves storing data and running programs using an outside 
computer such as a third-party server. 
 123. Id. at 173–74. 
 124. Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party 
Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 39–40 (2011). 
 125. See Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
1381, 1401–03 (2008). 
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C. Shared Privacy 
As a counterpart to limiting the third party doctrine, courts and 
legislatures could approach the problem from the other end and 
create an intermediate level of privacy between public and private, a 
sort of “shared privacy” concept. Rather than having “private” refer 
only to an individual and “public” refer to everything else, the law 
could recognize that some information and content is shared with 
the expectation that it will be maintained in privacy by the other 
users privy to the communication. The law has formally recognized 
that this is possible by protecting attorney-client confidences and 
corporate trade secrets. While the interests in information disclosed 
online may not deserve such nearly absolute protections, recognizing 
that there may still be some expectation of privacy in shared 
communications is more consistent with how people actually interact 
with each other. 
This shared privacy concept would have the benefit of protecting 
against warrantless government searches of subscriber information 
provided to Internet service providers, e-mail stored on third-party 
servers, and content provided to Internet service providers with the 
subjective expectation that it will remain private among the parties 
involved. This rule could still be tempered by the two prongs of the 
Katz test and the contractual expectations in the terms provided by 
Internet service providers. Should Internet service providers not 
desire to protect users’ privacy for whatever reason, they could still 
make it known in their user agreements, provided that they actually 
draw attention to those terms to assure knowing assent.  
To a very limited extent, this concept of “shared privacy” already 
exists. The Fourth Amendment implicitly recognizes that there is an 
intermediate level of privacy with certain relationships such as those 
between family members or between owners and houseguests.126 
Such shared privacy has even been allowed to be “portable,” 
allowing “transmission from one private enclave . . . to another.”127 
However, to be useful to digital privacy, this concept would have to 
be expanded to include Internet service providers, although there is a 
lesser degree of trust given to the third party than with family or 
house guests, and that trust is based on contract rather than close 
association. 
                                                
 126. Brenner, supra note 8, at 73. 
 127. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)). 
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One drawback to creating this intermediate level of privacy is 
that it could potentially apply to well-settled forms of 
communication that are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, 
such as phone records or regular mail communications, as discussed 
above. Privacy law could be expanded to further protect traditional 
forms of communication, if desired, but otherwise, the rules and 
regulations regarding this “shared privacy” would need to be 
carefully crafted to apply only to digital communications. Or perhaps 
it could simply be limited to protect information shared with a 
company that is critical to enabling that company to provide service. 
This would still have application outside of cyberspace, but would 
narrow the protection to only critically shared information, such as 
contact information or location data from cell phone companies. 
Even then, this information would still be available to law 
enforcement, but only with a warrant supported by probable 
cause.128 
Ultimately, expanding the concept of “shared privacy” and 
explicitly recognizing its application to the Fourth Amendment 
would enhance the privacy and trust between individuals and those 
with whom they conduct business.129 This solution is relatively 
simple and would help restore the lost sense of digital privacy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment seeks to protect the privacy of 
individuals by preventing unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government, but that interest is not currently served in the digital 
context by the reasonable expectation of privacy standard. The 
problems associated with both the subjective and objective prongs of 
the test, along with the third party doctrine, are continually 
undermining the privacy of individuals in the digital context. New 
digital technologies have challenged what judges are willing to 
recognize as reasonable, and unfortunately courts have not 
responded favorably. Courts have limited privacy rights in matters 
involving personal computers and have potentially dissolved any 
privacy rights in matters involving e-mail through commercial 
services. With the growth of technology, these privacy interests are 
likely to be threatened further unless something is changed. 
                                                
 128. Id. at 80. 
 129. See id. 
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Legislatures and courts have the ability to correct the current 
problems with the reasonable expectation of privacy standard by 
using empirical evidence to measure what society is willing to 
recognize as reasonable, eliminating or substantially narrowing the 
third party doctrine, and creating an intermediate category of privacy 
(“shared privacy”) that recognizes the realities of sharing information 
in a digital world. Changing the current standard has the potential to 
maintain levels of privacy amidst technological progress and restore 
some protections that have been lost through the current reasonable 
expectation of privacy formula. 
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